{"id":1492,"date":"2011-12-03T00:00:15","date_gmt":"2011-12-03T05:00:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/?p=1492"},"modified":"2021-11-18T13:58:23","modified_gmt":"2021-11-18T18:58:23","slug":"beyond-history-nietzsche-benjamin-and-adorno","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/?p=1492","title":{"rendered":"Beyond history? Nietzsche, Benjamin and Adorno"},"content":{"rendered":"

Historical specificity, the temporality of capital, and the supra-historical<\/h2>\n

Chris Cutrone<\/h2>\n

Presented on a panel with Fabian Arzuaga, Bo-Mi Choi and G. S. Sahota at the Critical Historical Studies conference<\/a>, Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory (3CT), University of Chicago, December 3, 2011.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

History is a way the present relates<\/em> to itself. History mediates<\/em> the present, and anticipates the future. The relation of past and present in history is a social<\/em> relation, a relation of society with itself, as a function of change<\/em>. The proper object of the present is history: the present is historical; it is constituted by history. The present is<\/em> history; history is the present<\/em>. As Hegel put it, the \u201cphilosophical\u201d approach to history is concerned with the \u201ceternally present:\u201d what in the past was always<\/em> present. This is a function of modernity<\/em>. What is at issue is the form of the present in history, or, the form of history in the present.<\/p>\n

Three writings, by Nietzsche, Benjamin and Adorno, respectively, reflect upon the specific form of history in capital, and on the possibility of transcending the historicism that emerged in the 19th century, as it continued to inform the 20th: Nietzsche\u2019s 1873 \u201cOn the Use and Abuse of History for Life;\u201d Benjamin\u2019s 1940 \u201cTheses on the Philosophy of History;\u201d and Adorno\u2019s 1942 \u201cReflections on Class Theory.\u201d Nietzsche\u2019s essay inspired Benjamin\u2019s; Adorno\u2019s followed directly upon Benjamin\u2019s.<\/p>\n

Nietzsche and the genesis of history <\/h2>\n

Nietzsche\u2019s second \u201cuntimely meditation\u201d (or \u201cunfashionable observation\u201d), \u201cOn the Use and Abuse of History for Life,\u201d critiqued what translator and Nietzsche scholar Peter Preuss called the 19th century \u201cdiscovery\u201d of history. Nietzsche regarded history specifically as a symptomatic expression of the genuine needs of the time. For Nietzsche, the symptom of history is expression of an illness, but Nietzsche\u2019s approach to such illness is as to \u201cpregnancy:\u201d not to be cured in the sense that it is eliminated, but rather undergone successfully to bring forth new life.<\/p>\n

19th century historicism was, for Nietzsche, the hallmark of a historically peculiar form of life: modern humanity. Modern humanity is historical in a precise sense: \u201chistory\u201d is historical. For Nietzsche, the question is what the symptom of history indicates about the need for humanity to overcome itself in present form. Nietzsche\u2019s expression for this potential self-overcoming of historical humanity is the \u201csupra-historical.\u201d It points beyond history, towards a new form of life that is possible in<\/em> history.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

For Nietzsche, there are three forms of the historical: the \u201cmonumental;\u201d the \u201cantiquarian;\u201d and the \u201ccritical.\u201d Nietzsche addressed these different phases of the historical as expressing different \u201cuses\u201d or needs for the historical in the \u201clife\u201d of humanity. In each of them the past figures differently. The forms of the historical are distinguished from the greater three categories with which Nietzsche\u2019s essay is concerned: the \u201cunhistorical;\u201d the \u201chistorical;\u201d and the \u201csupra-historical.\u201d The latter three categories refer, respectively, to the pre-human, the human, and the supra-human. Humanity becomes itself through history; and it potentially overcomes or transforms itself in transcending itself as historical. As Preuss pointed out, history is the record of the \u201cself-production\u201d of humanity. Therefore, the transformation of humanity, the changes in its self-production, changes history, and changes what the past is for humanity. In this respect, it is possible to address Nietzsche\u2019s essay as indicating the possibility for going beyond the historical, or overcoming the present relation humanity has to itself, in and through history.<\/p>\n

Benjamin and Adorno on Nietzsche and Marxism <\/h2>\n

Benjamin, and Adorno following him, appropriated Nietzsche\u2019s account of history for their Marxist critical theory of the \u201cphilosophy of history,\u201d specifying Nietzsche\u2019s symptomology of history as symptomatic of capital<\/em>. For Benjamin and Adorno, Nietzsche\u2019s account of history was historically specific to its moment of capital, the late 19th century, with further implication for the 20th century.<\/p>\n

What would it mean to get \u201cbeyond history?\u201d First, it is necessary to identify, as Adorno put it, \u201cwhat history is:\u201d its possibility and necessity. For Benjamin, history originates in the demand for redemption<\/em>. Following Benjamin\u2019s \u201cTheses on the Philosophy of History,\u201d and responding to Marx and Engels\u2019s Communist Manifesto<\/em>, in \u201cReflections on Class Theory\u201d Adorno wrote that,<\/p>\n

According to [Marxian] theory, history is the history of class struggles. But the concept of class is bound up with the emergence of the proletariat. .\u00a0.\u00a0. By exposing the historical necessity that had brought capitalism into being, political economy became the critique of history as a whole. .\u00a0.\u00a0. All history is the history of class struggles because it was always the same thing, namely, prehistory. This gives us a pointer as to how we can recognize what history is. From the most recent form of injustice, a steady light reflects back on history as a whole. Only in this way can theory enable us to use the full weight of history to gain an insight into the present without succumbing in resignation to the burden of the past.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This relation of pre-history, history, and a potential post-historical condition was, for Adorno, the relation of the present to the \u201cburden of the past:\u201d can it be redeemed?<\/p>\n

Adorno addressed a certain problem in Marxism\u2019s so-called \u201cdialectical\u201d approach to history, in that it tended to be, paradoxically, one-sided:<\/p>\n

[Marxism has been praised] on account of its dynamism. .\u00a0.\u00a0. Dynamism is merely one side of dialectic: it is the side preferred by the belief in practicality. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The other, less popular aspect of dialectic is its static side. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The law that, according to the Hegelian dialectic, governs the restlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-new consists in the fact that at every moment the ever-new is also the old lying close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old but is the old in distress.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This was Adorno\u2019s interpretation and attempted further elaboration of Benjamin\u2019s injunction to read history \u201cagainst the grain\u201d (Thesis VII). But what did Adorno mean by \u201cthe new?\u201d<\/p>\n

Potential futures are generated out of the relation of past and present, out of the relation of the present to itself through history<\/em>. The dynamic of history is inherent in the self-contradiction of the present: history is a projection of it. What is the \u201cpracticality\u201d of history? The emergence or departure of the new is the self-overcoming of the present, or the self-overcoming of history: its immanent transcendence. Nietzsche\u2019s phrase, \u201cself-overcoming\u201d is, literally, the \u201cSelbstaufhebung:\u201d self-fulfillment and self-negation. The present provides an opportunity for the self-overcoming of history.<\/p>\n

The \u201cnew is the old in distress\u201d because it is the present in tension with itself: is the present merely the ever-same? The \u201cstatic side of the dialectic,\u201d in which the \u201cever-new is the old lying close at hand,\u201d means that, as Benjamin put it, \u201cevery second is the strait gate through which the Messiah [redemption] might enter\u201d (Addendum B). The \u201chomogeneous\u201d and \u201cempty\u201d time of the ever-same is also, potentially, the \u201cfull\u201d time-of-the-now (Jetztzeit<\/em>). History is dialectical, but it is a \u201cnegative\u201d dialectic of the present: the present, in its potential for self-overcoming, disintegrates as history disintegrates into the mere facticity of the past. Historicism is a symptom of failed self-overcoming. For Benjamin, the task was to \u201cconstruct\u201d history, rather than to merely \u201cadd\u201d the new to the old (Thesis XVII). This is the contrast Adorno found between the new as \u201cthe old lying close at hand\u201d and the \u201crestlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-new\u201d that is \u201calways the same thing, namely, prehistory.\u201d The \u201cstatic side\u201d of the dialectic of history is thus a resource<\/em>. The question is whether it is a resource for the emergence of the new or the perpetuation of the old: either, or both.<\/p>\n

Nietzsche\u2019s \u201cuntimeliness\u201d <\/h2>\n

The discontent of history is the source of Nietzsche\u2019s \u201cuntimely thought.\u201d What potential critique<\/em> of the present does history offer? Nietzsche recognized himself as a product of 19th century historicism. Nietzsche characterized as \u201cantiquarian\u201d the deadly transformation of history into the mere facticity of the past. As a Classical philologist, Nietzsche was well prepared to address the melancholy of modernity expressed in historicism. As Benjamin put it, quoting Flaubert, \u201cFew people can guess how despondent one has to be in order to resuscitate Carthage\u201d (Thesis VII). (The reference to Carthage echoes that with which Nietzsche began his essay, the Ceterum censeo<\/em> [\u201cI judge otherwise\u201d] of Cato the Elder: \u201cCarthago delenda est<\/em> [Carthage must be destroyed].\u201d As Nietzsche put it, this was the spirit with which his \u201cconsideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history\u201d began.) In response to such threatening acedia<\/em>, Nietzsche contrasted his \u201ccritical\u201d approach to history.<\/p>\n

Here it becomes clear how badly man needs, often enough, in addition to the monumental and antiquarian ways of seeing the past, a third <\/em>kind, the critical<\/em>: and this again in the service of life as well. He must have the strength, and use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable him to live: this he achieves by dragging it to the bar of judgment, interrogating it meticulously and finally condemning it; every past, however, is worth condemning.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This approach, Nietzsche pointed out, was counter to the historicist passion of his time, the prevalent \u201cconsumptive historical fever.\u201d Nevertheless, Nietzsche found his own philological concerns to motivate a certain dissatisfaction with the ethos<\/em> inherent in \u201cthe powerful historical tendency of the times, as it has been, by common knowledge, observed for the past two generations, particularly among the Germans\u201d since the early 19th\u00a0 century.<\/p>\n

I must be allowed to ascribe this much to myself on account of my profession as a classical philologist, for I would not know what sense classical philology would have in our age unless it is to be effective by its inappropriateness for the times, that is, in opposition to the age, thus working on the age, and, we hope, for the benefit of a coming time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The consummation and self-destruction of 19th century historicism in Nietzsche presented the demand for the \u201csupra-historical,\u201d for getting beyond the historical comportment that had produced Nietzsche, a self-overcoming of history.<\/p>\n

Beyond history? <\/h2>\n

The question of getting beyond history relates to Nietzsche\u2019s characterization of \u201ccritical history,\u201d that is, the possibility and necessity of \u201ccondemning a past\u201d in creating what he called a \u201cnew nature.\u201d This is the need to forget<\/em>. This is not the forgetting that might be taken to characterize the unhistorical, animal condition (according to Nietzsche, the unhistorical condition is that of the grazing animal, which does not speak because it immediately forgets what it was going to say). \u201cForgetting,\u201d in Nietzsche\u2019s sense, is an activity in service of life: it can only be considered, not unhistorical, but post- or supra-historical, that is, a form of historical forgetting that overcomes a form of remembering. There is a human need to forget that is not natural but develops: it is a new<\/em> need.<\/p>\n

For Benjamin, the need to \u201cforget\u201d is related to the need to \u201credeem\u201d history. \u201cRedeemed\u201d history could not only be potentially \u201ccited\u201d in \u201call its moments,\u201d but also, more importantly, forgotten<\/em>. The need to remember is matched by the need to forget. So, the question turns on the necessity for remembering that would need to be overcome in order to make forgetting, in a transcendent sense, possible and desirable.<\/p>\n

Benjamin\u2019s concept of historical redemption in the \u201cTheses on the Philosophy of History\u201d was informed by the correspondence he conducted with Horkheimer on the Arcades Project<\/em> (for which the \u201cTheses\u201d were drafted as an introduction), specifically concerning redemption. Horkheimer pointed out that any redemption must be qualified: the dead remained dead; their sacrifice could not be redeemed in certain respects. For Benjamin, this affected the quality of history: it became the record of wasted potential, or \u201cbarbarism.\u201d This was history\u2019s standing reproach to the present.<\/p>\n

If, for Nietzsche, \u201ccritical history\u201d means standing in judgment over history, by contrast, for Benjamin, the critical value of history was in its judgment over the present: history was an effect of the present\u2019s judgment of itself<\/em>. What does the present need to remember; what to forget? What does it need to judge<\/em>? If Nietzsche called for the historian to be \u201cman enough\u201d to judge the past, for Benjamin, the required \u201cstrength\u201d was to receive history\u2019s judgment and not be devastated by it: the memory of \u201censlaved ancestors\u201d (Thesis XII). For the nature and character of both the ancestry and the enslavement were precisely the matters to be judged, remembered and forgotten. From what are we descended, and from what must we free ourselves? How do we judge this?<\/p>\n

Capital as form of history to be redeemed <\/h2>\n

Adorno identifies \u201chow we can recognize what history is\u201d by the \u201csteady light\u201d reflecting \u201cfrom the most recent form of injustice.\u201d The theory<\/em> that is thus enabled, without succumbing to the past, must be able to distinguish the potential for the present to depart from the \u201cever-same.\u201d For Benjamin, this \u201cMessianic\u201d potential for redemption available in every present moment is the product of two opposed vectors: regression and stasis. The \u201cstatic side\u201d of the historical dialectic that Adorno identified was, for Benjamin, the potential \u201cexploding\u201d of the \u201ccontinuum of history\u201d (Thesis XVI), a \u201cstandstill\u201d (Thesis XVI), or \u201cactivating the emergency brake on the locomotive of history\u201d (Paralipomena Thesis XVIIa). The motivation for this was the \u201cregression of society\u201d (Thesis XI). Otherwise, one might \u201csuccumb,\u201d \u201cin resignation to the burden of the past.\u201d<\/p>\n

Capital presents an apparently unredeemable history, at least in any traditional (theological) sense of redemption. Benjamin was no melancholic but rather sought to diagnose and potentially overcome the melancholy of modernity. But this could only be achieved immanently, from within modernity\u2019s \u201cdialectic\u201d of history. This dialectic had, for Adorno, two sides: dynamic and static. The dialectic of history in capital is one of constantly generated but wasted new potentials. This is its \u201cinjustice,\u201d what gives modernity its peculiar, specific melancholy, affecting its demand for redemption. While all of human history may have been characterized by the Messianic demand for redemption, modern history\u2019s demand for redemption is specific and peculiar. Modern history liquidates all prior history, however rendering it, according to Benjamin, more as \u201crubble\u201d (Thesis IX) than as resource.<\/p>\n

Modern history ruins prior forms of redemption, in favor of what is, for Benjamin, a specious form of remembering: history as the accumulation of mere facts. What would be its \u201copposite?\u201d The traditional Messianic eschatological \u201cend of time\u201d is matched by the modern \u201cmonstrous abbreviation\u201d that summarizes the entire history of humanity (Thesis XVIII) in capital: an appropriation of all of history that threatens to become its barbarization. For Benjamin, this must be countered by a constructed \u201cconstellation,\u201d in which the demand for the redemption of history transforms the time of the present into one of potential secular<\/em> redemption: not the negation<\/em> of time as in the coming of the Messiah, but the redemption of<\/em> time, in<\/em> time (Addendum A). This would amount to the effective transformation of history, a \u201cfulfillment\u201d of the \u201chere-and-now\u201d appearing as a \u201ccharged past\u201d that has the ability to \u201cleap into the open sky of history\u201d (Thesis XIV) as opposed to subordination to a \u201cchain of events\u201d (Thesis IX) or \u201ccausal nexus\u201d (Addendum A). Neither celestial redemption outside of time nor secular time without redemption, Benjamin\u2019s philosophy of history seeks the relation of modern temporality to the transformed demand for redemption.<\/p>\n

The question is how to overcome the ideological abuse of history to which it is subject in modernity. This abuse is due to the form of temporality in capital. For Benjamin, this concerns the \u201ccitability\u201d of the moments of the past, which modern society makes possible \u2014 and necessary. This is no mere addition to knowledge of the past, a quantitative increase, but rather the fundamental qualitative transformation of what counts as historical knowledge, the self-knowledge of humanity as a function of time. Is the self-production and self-transformation of humanity a function of time<\/em>? In capital, this is the case, but in a certain sense, producing what Benjamin called a \u201ccausal chain\u201d of events \u201canterior\u201d to the present. However, such spatialization of time, once, historically, did not, and so, potentially, would no longer, pertain in a \u201csupra-historical\u201d condition for humanity, as prognosed by Nietzsche.<\/p>\n

The temporality of capital <\/h2>\n

From the transformation of<\/em> time in<\/em> time, it becomes possible to turn the \u201cabbreviation\u201d of time in capital into the potential supersession of the form of change as a function of<\/em> time. From Nietzsche\u2019s \u201ccritical\u201d approach to history, as an active appropriation of the present, Benjamin turned to the reception of history as critical to the present: the present as crisis<\/em> of history. Where, for Nietzsche, the culmination of history was the crisis of the historical, and the possibility for a supra-historical form of humanity, for Benjamin, the culmination of the peculiar historical comportment of modern humanity is the crisis of history, the crisis of humanity. All of history becomes citable, but as amalgamation<\/em>. Where, for Nietzsche, a future changed condition \u201cmust come\u201d if humanity is to survive<\/em>, for Benjamin, if history is to be redeemed, humanity must be transformed<\/em>. (Benjamin: \u201cHumanity is preparing to outlive culture, if need be;\u201d this is Nietzsche\u2019s \u201cstrange goal.\u201d)<\/p>\n

As Adorno concluded his \u201cReflections on Class Theory,\u201d \u201cThis means, however, that dehumanization is also its opposite. .\u00a0.\u00a0. Even if the dynamic at work was always the same, its end today is not the end.\u201d The transformation of humanity envisioned by Benjamin and Adorno, appropriating Nietzsche\u2019s discontent in history, was one that would transcend all historical culture \u201chitherto.\u201d Benjamin and Adorno matched Nietzsche\u2019s \u201crumination\u201d with Marx and Engels\u2019s Manifesto<\/em>. The self-overcoming of the entire history of civilization and of its \u201cprocess of transmission\u201d (which cannot be avoided but only \u201creversed,\u201d pointing not to the future but the past) would be \u201cagainst the grain\u201d of the historical progress that can only be regarded as \u201cregression:\u201d the inversion of the meaning of history; the end of history as the end of pre-history in the present, or, the potential redemption of the history of civilization that capital makes possible of itself.<\/p>\n

The dialectic of memory and forgetting involves changes in both the forms of remembering and the process of forgetting. A form of remembrance is a way of forgetting. It serves a certain way of life. To remember is to forget in a certain way; to forget is to overcome a certain need to remember, and to overcome the past in a certain way. If the present is an effect of history, then it is in the way the past causes<\/em> the present.<\/p>\n

Why is the past, in modernity (according to Benjamin, following Nietzsche), \u201ccitable\u201d in all of its moments? Because all of history is (potentially) negated<\/em> by capital \u2014 just as it is (potentially) fulfilled<\/em> by it. The question is the possibility and necessity of the appropriation of all of history in capital. The mode of appropriation of the past in capital, its \u201cprocess of transmission,\u201d is the society prevailing throughout \u201call of history:\u201d \u201cbarbarism.\u201d This means that all moments of the past potentially become culpable in capital, by becoming the endless resource of the present: history. Capital is the literal \u201cAufhebung\u201d of history. But can capital become the Selbst<\/em>-aufhebung of history? Or does modern history exhibit, rather, a dynamic that is alien<\/em> to all of history, as it was practiced hitherto (prior to the challenge of modernity)? Is capital the potential for redemption in history, or its ultimate denial, its final liquidation? The fundamental ambivalence of history in capital is the key to what it is<\/em>: an injustice to be made good. This is what capital has promised humanity at the end of history. Can it be fulfilled? Will it? (( This link between redemption and forgetting has its utopic as well as dystopic valences. As Kafka wrote in conclusion of his last published story, \u201cJosephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk\u201d (in The Complete Stories<\/em>, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir [New York: Schocken, 1995], 360\u2013376), in a decidedly non-human, zoomorphic parable:
\n“Josephine’s road, however, must go downhill. The time will soon come when her last notes sound and die into silence. She is a small episode in the eternal history of our people, and the people will get over the loss of her. Not that it will be easy for us; how can our gatherings take place in utter silence? Still, were they not silent even when Josephine was present? Was her actual piping notably louder and more alive than the memory of it will be? Was it even in her lifetime more than a simple memory? Was it not rather because Josephine’s singing was already past losing in this way that our people in their wisdom prized it so highly?
\n\t“So perhaps we shall not miss so very much after all, while Josephine, redeemed from the earthly sorrows which to her thinking lay in wait for all chosen spirits, will happily lose herself in the numberless throng of the heroes of our people, and soon, since we are no historians, will rise to the heights of redemption and be forgotten like all her brothers.” (376) )) | \u00a7<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Bibliography<\/h3>\n

Adorno, Theodor W., \u201cReflections on Class Theory,\u201d trans. Rodney Livingstone, Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader<\/em>, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 93\u2013110.<\/p>\n

Benjamin, Walter, \u201cTheses on the Philosophy of History,\u201d trans. Harry Zohn, Illuminations<\/em>, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1968), 255\u2013266; \u201cOn the Concept of History,\u201d trans. Dennis Redmond (2005), available on-line at: <http:\/\/www.marxists.org\/reference\/archive\/benjamin\/1940\/history.htm<\/a>>; \u201cParalipomena to \u2018On the Concept of History\u2019,\u201d Selected Writings<\/em> vol. 4 1938\u201340 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006), 401\u201311.<\/p>\n

Nietzsche, Friedrich, \u201cOn the Use and Abuse of History for Life,\u201d trans. Ian Johnston (2010), available on-line at: <http:\/\/records.viu.ca\/~johnstoi\/nietzsche\/history.htm<\/a>>; On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life<\/em>, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980).<\/p>\n\n

Note<\/h3>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Historical specificity, the temporality of capital, and the supra-historical Chris Cutrone Presented on a panel with Fabian Arzuaga, Bo-Mi Choi and G. S. Sahota at the Critical Historical Studies conference, Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory (3CT), University of Chicago, December 3, 2011. History is a way the present relates to itself. History mediates the present, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[29,18,28,8,16],"class_list":["post-1492","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-presentations","tag-29","tag-adorno","tag-benjamin","tag-conferences","tag-marxism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1492","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1492"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1492\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3205,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1492\/revisions\/3205"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1492"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1492"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chriscutrone.platypus1917.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1492"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}